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OF PUBLIC FIGURES AND PUBLIC INTEREST-THE
LIBEL LAW CONUNDRUM
GERALD G. ASHDOWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
From whatever source-whether a renewed interest in the self
and psychic damage,' loss spreading principles,2 confusion,3 or sim-
ply a pronounced anitcorporate, antimedia bias-recent years have
seen a resurgence in the law of libel and libel litigation.4 If libel law
was dead following New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and its prog-
eny,6 it certainly has enjoyed a resurrection in the wake of Gertz v.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University. B.B.A 1969, J.D. 1972, University of Iowa.
1. See Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-21 (1983).
2. Id. at 22-36; see also Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and Decency, 65
VA. L. REv. 785 (1979).
3. Smolla, supra note 1, at 47-63. In addition to suggesting that libel law has been rejuve-
nated by a heightened awareness of the inner self, strict liability principles, and doctrinal
confusion, Smolla argues that the coalescence of the entertaining and informing functions
has likewise contributed to the increase in defamation suits. Id. at 36-47.
4. See Jenkins, Chilly Days for the Press, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1983, at 22; Kupfenberg,
Libel Fever, COLUM. J. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1981; Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsid-
ered: Time to Return to the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 CoLuM. L.
REV. 603, 603 (1983); LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, BULL. No. 4, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
LIBEL LITIGATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1982); LIBEL DEFENSE
RESOURCE CENTER, BULL. No. 7, INDEPENDENT APPELLATE REVIEW IN LIBEL ACTIONS SINCE
New York Times v. Sullivan (1983). The federal courts of appeals decided twenty-five defa-
mation cases in 1983, and the federal district courts reported fifty libel decisions last year.
The two most widely publicized recent libel cases were brought by General Westmoreland
and Carol Burnett. General Westmoreland sued CBS for broadcasting a 1982 documentary,
"The Uncounted Enemy- A Vietnam Deception," which suggested Westmoreland's involve-
ment in the underestimation of enemy troop levels in Vietnam. See Westmoreland v. CBS,
Inc., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2493 (D.S.C. 1982). Carol Burnett sued the National Enquirer
for $10 million over an article appearing in the tabloid suggesting that she traipsed around a
Washington restaurant while intoxicated, sharing her dessert, spilling wine, and arguing
with Henry Kissinger. She received a $1.6 million jury verdict reduced by the judge to
$800,000 on remittitur, and ultimately reduced on appeal to $200,000. See Burnett v. Na-
tional Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981), modified, 144 Cal. App.
3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Although the Supreme Court has decided 18 defamation cases following New York
Times, I am here referring primarily to Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967),
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The resurrection of libel law has occurred, at least partially, be-
cause of the Supreme Court's recent solicitude for personal reputa-
tion. In a series of decisions beginning with Gertz, progressing
through Herbert v. Lando,8 and culminating in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine9 and Calder v. Jones,10 the Supreme Court has progres-
sively facilitated redress by both private and public plaintiffs for
the publication of false information. This direct policy and doctri-
nal shift is not all that has affected libel litigation. Equally impor-
tant are the more subtle policy and attitudinal notions emanating
from the Court's latest libel decisions, which filter down and per-
meate the world of libel plaintiffs, juries, trial judges, and appellate
courts. Both the jurisprudential shift and this concomitant psycho-
logical phenomenon, whether leading or combining with other fac-
tors,"' have produced the reemergence of the libel lawsuit.
It is from this perspective that reexamination of our constitu-
tionally based libel rules should proceed. Any reconsideration or
reformulation of legal doctrine should necessarily take as its refer-
ence point, not only the current state of the law, but also the doc-
trinal trends that have propelled legal rules into their present form
and the underlying sociopolitical atmosphere-or psycho-emo-
tional factor-that shape doctrinal developments. Only in this way
can we avoid the natural inclination to jump on the bandwagon
and follow the trend regardless of whether it is misguided or has
become jurisprudentially saturated.12
Associated Press v. Walker, decided with Butts, and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403
U.S 29 (1971).
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see also Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
8. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
9. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
10. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
11. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
12. One certainly might argue that, in recent decisions exhibiting solicitude for personal
reputation, the Supreme Court has retreated far enough from thorough first amendment
protection. Gertz not only removed the New York Times sanctuary in the case of suits
brought by private plaintiffs, but it also-along with Firestone, Woston, and Hutchin-
son-narrowed considerably the definition of a public figure. Likewise, the recent jurisdic-
tional decisions of Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984), and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984), clearly favor recovery for libel over free press interests. Of recent
cases, only Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984), holding
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With this in mind, we can reexamine the status of public figures
and determine whether we should place public figures in the "same
legal hopper as public officials."13 Although the public person cate-
gory sounds generic, the Supreme Court in Gertz, Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,1 4 Hutchinson v. Proxmire,5 and Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Association,'6 discovered that the category was not as ho-
mogeneous as Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts 7 and Associated
Press v. Walker's would have had us believe. In other words, we
can identify both "public figures" and "public" figures, with only
the former being made to suffer the same legal treatment as public
officials when suing media defendants. The question here, of
course, is when should media defendants-or anyone else for that
matter' 9l-be entitled to the protection of the New York Times ac-
tual malice standard in a defamation action brought against them.
This not only reopens the question of public figure status, but also
reopens the larger constitutional question of what kind of first
amendment protection ought to be available to media defendants
threatened with libel litigation. Determination of the meaning of
free speech and free press in this context cannot be restricted cate-
gorically to a reexamination of the issue of public figures alone.
that appellate judges must independently review the record to determine if actual malice
has been established, is a pure free press decision.
13. Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 908 (1984).
14. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
15. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
16. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
17. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
18. Id.
19. Because Justice Powell's majority opinion in Gertz spoke only of publishers and
broadcasters, 418 U.S. at 340, one might argue that the New York Times rule applies only to
media defendants. See, e.g., Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 425-26, 579 P.2d 83, 84-85 (1978);
Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 364-71, 568 P.2d 1359, 1362-65
(1977); Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 499-506, 228 N.W.2d 737, 745-48 (1975).
Most courts, however, have concluded that no distinction between defendants can be drawn
because the first amendment protects freedom of speech as well as press. See, e.g., Jacron
Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 590-94, 350 A.2d 688, 694-96 (1976); Ryder Truck Rentals
v. Latham, 593 S.W.2d 334, 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 580B comment e (1977). Aside from the fact that the first amendment refers to
both speech and press, drawing lines between free speech and free press based on the func-
tions each serves in our society would be dangerous. Such a distinction would then require
that "the press" be defined.
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With this in mind, let me begin by exploring the public figure
issue.
II. OF PUBLIC FIGURES
The preliminary question is the extent to which public figures
actually are treated like public officials under the constitutional-
ized law of libel. Professor Schauer seems to assume that all public
figures are treated alike and are always assimilated with public of-
ficials.20 In fact, this is not true because the constitutional term
"public figures" is, after Gertz and its progeny, much narrower
than might be supposed.
In Gertz and Time, Inc. v. Firestone,21 the first cases to signal
retrenchment of first amendment protection for the press in libel
cases, the Court defined public figures in the following way:
For the most part those who attain this status have assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some oc-
cupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly,
those classified as public figures have thrust themselves to the
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved. 2
The Court thus developed two subcategories of this classifica-
tion-the general public figure, and the specific or special public
figure. The constitutional legitimacy of treating public figures like
public officials for the purpose of protecting the media and free-
dom of the press from libel litigation can be determined only by
examining separately the two categories.
According to the Court,23 the second category of public figure is
the more common. Basically, the Court's decisions demonstrate
that visibility or involvement in public events does not make one a
special public figure. Elmer Gertz, 4 Mary Alice Firestone,25 Ron-
20. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 906-09.
21. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
22. Id. at 453 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345).
23. See id.
24. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
25. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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aid Hutchinson,2 6 and Ilya Wolston 7 were all relatively public peo-
ple. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that they did not fall
into the special public figure category. The Court rejected the no-
tion that involvement in public events was sufficient,28 and con-
cluded that, in order to become a public figure for a limited range
of issues, the plaintiff had to thrust himself into a public contro-
versy as substantial as a public debate.29 In other words, to become
a special public figure, the plaintiff must voluntarily enter a public
debate "in order to influence the resolution of [public] issues.'3°
26. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
27. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
28. Although the Court in Gertz speculated that "someone [could] become a public figure
through no purposeful action of his own," 418 U.S. at 345, the Court also stated that "in-
stances of truly involuntary involvement public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id. The
Court's subsequent decisions, however, have eliminated even this possibility. In Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court partly relied on Mary Alice Firestone's lack of
voluntary involvement to hold that she was not a public figure. The Court stated that "re-
spondent [did not] freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married
life. . . . '[R]esort to the judicial process . . . is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than
that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court.'" Id. at 454 (quoting
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971)).
Consistently, in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979), the Court held
that failure to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet espionage, and thus volunta-
rily engaging in criminal conduct, did not make the plaintiff a public figure. Id. at 166-69.
The Court stated that a "private individual is not automatically transformed into a public
figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public atten-
tion." Id. at 167. Likewise, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), the Court con-
cluded that the receipt and benefit of public grants did not make one a public figure, and
that "Hutchinson did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence
others." Id. at 135. The Court also stated that "[c]learly, those charged with defamation
cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a public
figure." Id.
29. In Wolston, the Court concluded that the petitioner's failure to respond to a grand
jury's subpoena was not designed to invite public comment or influence the public with
respect to any issue of public concern. 443 U.S. at 168. In fact, at one point, the Court states
that "[i]t is difficult to determine with precision the 'public controversy' into which peti-
tioner is alleged to have thrust himself. Certainly, there was no public controversy or debate
in 1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in the United States; all re-
sponsible United States citizens understandably were and are opposed to it." Id. at 166 n.8
(emphasis added). Similarly, in Hutchinson, the Court concluded that "Hutchinson did not
thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others" because no public
controversy existed-a concern for general public expenditures is shared by most people. Id.
at 135. See also Smolla, supra note 1, at 54-59.
30. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. Many lower courts have not followed this drastic restriction on
the definition of a public figure. See e.g., Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637 F.2d 375 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 964 (1981); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287
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Treating this type of plaintiff the same as public officials is consti-
tutionally consistent even under a limited view of freedom of the
press. Under this narrow view, both the public official and the per-
son who tries to influence public issues lie at the core of the first
amendment-the functioning of the democratic political process
and influence on public affairs-and thus should be amenable to
uninhibited media scrutiny.
The other category of public figure-the general public
figure-is more difficult precisely because it establishes a generic
group of individuals who are not, in the first amendment sense,
completely fungible. This is where Professor Schauer spots trouble.
He questions why the constitutional law of libel should treat
Michael Jackson, Reggie Jackson, and Leonard Bernstein the same
as Dan Rather, William F. Buckley, Jr., Jerry Falwell, and Lee
Iacocca.3 1 Even though all of these people have "achiev[ed] ...
pervasive fame and notoriety, ' 32 not all "occupy positions of...
persuasive power and influence"3 3 over the determination of public
policy. They do not lie, therefore, at the core of free press theory
or the heart of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
3 4
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club,
595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (dicta); Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Col. 1982);
McManus v. Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Vitale v. National Lam-
poon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440
(S.D. Ga. 1976), afl'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978); Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422, 581
P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1978); Byers v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp., 161 Ga. App. 717, 288
S.E.2d 698 (1982); Korbar v. Hite, 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135 (1976); State v.
Defley, 395 So. 2d 759 (La. 1981); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101
(Okla. 1978); Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1978).
31. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 908, 916.
32. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
33. Id. at 345.
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). By focusing on Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Butts and
Walker, Professor Schauer sees protection of the discussion of matters involving those
wielding political power as the real thrust of the New York Times line of cases. See Schauer,
supra note 13, at 918-19. One certainly can argue, however, that this is not the only consid-
eration shaping New York Times theory. Although favoring a less demanding standard than
the actual malice rule, Justice Harlan's opinion for four members of the Court in Butts and
Walker stated that "'[t]he guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political
expression or comment upon public affairs. . .' [Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
F]reedom of discussion 'must embrace all issues about which information is needed or ap-
propriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'
[Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).]" 388 U.S. at 147. Additionally, Justices
Black and Douglas, whose votes provided the majority in Butts and Walker for application
942
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This is not an argument for treating public figures differently
from public officials, however, it is simply an argument for defining
more narrowly who is a public figure in the general sense.3 5 Some
prominent people are in a position, because of their particular type
of prominence, to have persuasive power and sociopolitical im-
pact-"the chairman of the board of General Motors; the president
of the AFL-CIO; the archbishop of Boston; the publisher of the
New York Times; [and] the anchorman of the CBS Evening
News" 36-while other famous people have little impact on politics,
government, or public issues. One could argue that this latter
group-Professor Schauer's archetype seems to be the entertainer
or professional athlete37-- should not be assimilated with the pub-
lic official, special public figure, or politically influential general
public figure, all of whom have direct or indirect influence on pub-
lic policy. Thus, the Supreme Court's already narrowed definition 8
might be limited even further to exclude those plaintiffs who are
nonpolitical public personalities.
The problem, however, is in trying to determine which public
figures fall into such a category. Many people who have acquired
public notoriety for their nonpolitical talents and activity become
politically active and influential after their notoriety is established.
Examples include Dick Gregory, Jane Fonda, and Paul Newman.
Although one might argue that these cases are on the fringes in-
stead of the poles, more cases may exist on the fringes than any-
where else. After all, we have an ex-actor President,39 an ex-astro-
of the New York Times malice test to public figures, had a much broader view of the first
amendment. See id. at 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 293-97 (Black, J., concurring). One should also note that a majority of
the Court in Gertz assimilated public figures with public officials because public figures as-
sume the risk of media exposure and have access to the channels of communication to
counteract false statements. 418 U.S. at 344.
35. Certainly, the special public figure who has "thrust [himself] to the forefront of par-
ticular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved,"
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, and the general public figure with "persuasive power and influence,"
id., would fall within a narrow, politically oriented theory of freedom of the press and the
New York Times standard.
36. Schauer, supra note 13, at 916.
37. See id. at 908, 917.
38. See Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61
MINN. L. REV. 645, 678-85 (1977).
39. Ronald Reagan.
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naut senator who wants to be president, 0 and a senator4 1 and a
congressman 42 who are ex-professional athletes.
Another factor that blurs any attempt to segregate political pub-
lic figures from nonpolitical ones is the realization that many pub-
lic figures make political statements through their work. Such
movies as "The China Syndrome," "War Games," "The Day Af-
ter," and the Vietnam war films43 are obvious examples. Even
"Terms of Endearment" speaks collectively about our culture.
Thus, even under a narrow view of the first amendment in which
free expression is restricted to political matters, ample justification
exists for providing the media with New York Times protection in
libel suits brought by public entertainers.
But however one views first amendment theory, and regardless
of the original free press foundation of Butts and Walker,44 there
are other considerations or counterpoints that argue for the appli-
cation of the actual malice standard to the nonpolitical public
figure. First, the Court in Gertz did not rest its decision distin-
guishing public figures from private individuals principally on a
free press notion. The Court suggested that the state had a
stronger interest in redressing harm to the reputation of private
persons because they had not assumed the risk of publicity and
because they lacked access to the channels of communication to
counteract false statements. 45 Whatever one thinks of the assump-
tion of risk argument, the access argument is a first amendment
notion-speech to contest speech-and thus, with respect to the
availability of the media forum, the nonpolitical public figure is in
the same category as other public figures recognized by Gertz. In
fact, in terms of access, entertainers, prominent athletes, and other
personalities may be in a more advantageous position than some
minor public officials and special public figures. Also, the access
notion is not necessarily limited to rebuttal. Public personalities
attract constant media attention, and whatever damage a defama-
tory publication may cause is likely to be rebuilt by continual me-
40. Sen. John Glenn.
41. Sen. Bill Bradley.
42. Rep. Jack F. Kemp.
43. "Coming Home"; "The Deer Hunter"; "Apocalypse Now."
44. See supra note 34.-
45. 418 U.S. at 344-46.
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dia exposure.46
Second, public figures, as well as other libel plaintiffs, are hardly
in a litigational box. The decision in Herbert v. Lando47 permits
the complaining party48 to spend countless hours and energy inves-
tigating the editorial process of the defendant to discover whether
the story was published with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless
disregard of the truth.49 The Herbert decision doubtlessly results
in the suppression of much derogatory material about persons who
can afford the expense of the discovery process, encourages settle-
ments once libel litigation is initiated,5° and discourages summary
judgment.5
Finally, regardless of the first amendment view one takes of the
46. Carol Burnett and Johnny Carson are good examples of the operation of this phenom-
enon. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Burnett v. National
Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981), modified, 144 Cal. App. 3d
991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
47. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
48. The plaintiff is not the only party who might engage in extensive discovery in a libel
action. In Herbert, for example, not only did Colonel Herbert's lawyers engage in exhaustive
discovery against CBS, but Colonel Herbert also produced over 12,000 pages of documents
at the request of CBS's lawyers. Lewis, supra note 4, at 611. Herbert, his literary agent, and
his ghost writer were also deposed at length. Id.
49. The magnitude of the discovery problem is accurately revealed by Herbert itself.
Barry Lando, the producer of the CBS documentary involved, was deposed over a period of
more than a year in twenty-six sessions producing almost 3,000 pages of transcript and 240
exhibits. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
"Also produced by CBS were videotapes and transcripts of all interviews done for the pro-
gram, notes of interviews conducted with 130 people, all of Lando's files, all documents in
CBS's files from the relevant period relating to Colonel Herbert, whether or not Lando and
the others connected with the program ever saw them, and transcripts and tapes of all of
Herbert's radio and television appearances form 1971 to 1981." Lewis, supra note 4, at 611
(footnotes omitted).
50. See Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 795, 800 & n.12; Smolla, supra note 1, at 6. Examples of recent settlements are
ABC's reported payment of $1.25 million in a suit brought against it by Synanon, a Califor-
nia communal organization, see Jenkins, supra note 4, at 25, and CBS's reported settlement
of between $250,000 and $400,000 in a suit filed by Mayor William J. Green of Philadelphia,
see N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, § 4, at 8, col. 4.
51. Although defendants are continuing to use the summary judgment procedure success-
fully, see LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, BULL. No. 4, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIBEL LiTr-
GATION: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF Hutchinson v. Proxmire (1982), the availability of exten-
sive discovery into the editorial process would certainly forestall the effectiveness of this
device. More troublesome, a good editorial process might actually discourage summary judg-
ment because internal questioning and criticism might be some evidence of negligence or
recklessness.
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publication of material about public personalities, that view has to
be balanced against the potential cost of defamation. In other
words, the question of regulating expression-through the law of
libel in this case-can be resolved only by considering the justifica-
tion for the regulation. In order to arrive at an appropriate consti-
tutional standard, the first amendment chill must be balanced
against injury to reputation.52
This is really the other side of the libel debate, and has received
somewhat less attention than the first amendment issue.53 The fo-
cus, of course, is on the harm to personal reputation caused by the
publication of false material. In most cases, the injury is entirely
psychic and no tangible damage is inflicted.5 4 What actual injury5r
did retired General Edwin Walker suffer in Associated Press v.
52. This is essentially Judge Learned Hand's balancing formula adopted by Chief Justice
Vinson's plurality opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The language of
the test comes from Judge Hand's decision for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Dennis: "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies [the challenged] invasion of free speech as ... necessary to avoid the danger." 183
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
53. Commentators on the constitutionalization of defamation law generally focus on the
first amendment considerations and ignore analysis of the reputational interest. This may
be due, in part, to the realization that little is here to analyze. For an interesting economic
analysis of recovery for injury to reputation, however, see Ingber, supra note 2.
54. Of course, exceptions do exist. Wally Butts, for example, eventually resigned as ath-
letic director at the University of Georgia. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 137. Whether this was
directly related to the story in the Saturday Evening Post, however, raises a question of
causation. Leonard Damron lost an election for county tax assessor after being falsely ac-
cused of perjury. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 296-97 (1971). Possi-
bly the best example of tangible injury is the case of John Henry Faulk. See Faulk v. Aware,
Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 302, 231 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1962), modified, 19 A.D.2d 464, 244
N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963), aff'd as modified, 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965). Faulk was charged with communist sympathies
and affiliations by the blacklisting organization, Aware, Inc. Faulk filed a libel action against
Aware and its founder and president Vincent Hartnett, and recovered $1 million in compen-
satory damages plus $1,250,000 punitive damages against each defendant after proving that
his career as a radio and television performer was destroyed. The award ultimately was
reduced on appeal to $400,000 compensatory damages and a total of $150,000 punitive dam-
ages. 19 A.D.2d 464, 244 N.Y.S.2d 259, aff'd as modified, 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (196.5).
55. I am not using the term "actual injury" to include "personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering" as the Supreme Court did in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, but am referring
only to tangible harm in the form of physical suffering or pecuniary loss. The inclusion of
humiliation, anguish, and suffering expands the tort of defamation beyond its historical and
common law function of redressing injury to the relational interest of reputation. See
Ashdown, supra note 38, at 669-72.
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Walker,5" what tangible loss did Carol Burnett suffer at the hands
of the National Enquirer,57 and what specific injury was inflicted
on General Westmoreland by the CBS news department?58 The
absence of actual loss is especially notable in the case of public
entertainers for whom the stories, whether true or not, represent
cultivated publicity.59 If the material becomes too caustic and the
humiliation too great, recovery generally can be obtained under the
New York Times malice standard.60
When harm to reputation from a defamatory publication is scru-
tinized under an economic analysis," the results are even more
vivid. Primary costs-the costs directly associated with the in-
jury-are usually nonexistent, unless one views emotional injury as
an intangible, actual cost. 2 Even then, this type of loss is non-
transferable and thus the imposition of liability on a defendant re-
sults in a double accounting.6 3 Similarly, secondary costs-those
associated with the economic impact of the injury-are generally
nonexistent in the absence of liability, but can become quite high
when a court shifts them to a defendant publisher.64 Additionally,
tertiary costs-the costs of administering our current liability sys-
tem6 5 -- are significant in the case of libel litigation.
I do not mean to suggest that mental anguish or emotional in-
jury should never be compensated. In many cases, there may be no
56. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
57. Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1981),
modified, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260
(1984).
58. General William Westmoreland is suing CBS for broadcasting the 1982 documentary,
"The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception," which suggested General Westmoreland's
involvement in the underestimation of enemy troop strength in Vietnam. The suit originally
was filed in the United States District Court for South Carolina, but was transferred to the
Southern District of New York on CBS's motion for a change of venue. See Westmoreland
v. CBS, Inc., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2493 (D.S.C. 1982); N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1982, at C34,
col. 1.
59. This is probably why, until recently, such tabloids as the National Enquirer have
rarely been sued.
60. The best example is the Carol Burnett case. See supra note 4.
61. See generally G. CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF AccmENTs (1970).
62. See Ingber, supra note 2, at 812-13, 824.
63. Id. at 820-21, 824.
64. Libel insurance, however, can decrease secondary costs when liability is imposed. See
id. at 813-14.
65. See G. CALARxsI, supra note 61, at 26-28.
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major countervailing policy consideration.6 But when the chilling
effect that libel litigation and judgments have on freedom of ex-
pression is recognized, the case for psychic damages loses much of
its strength, regardless of one's view of first amendment theory.
This factor distinguishes libel from other kinds of regulated speech
where the abuse and threat are more real.6 Adding libel to the list
that includes obscenity, contempt, disturbing the peace, and
"fighting words" does not remove it from careful first amendment
analysis.68
III. THE BACK SIDE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Professor Schauer's "back side" argument is based on the notion
that we cannot trust certain interests to the majoritarian pro-
cess-primarily legislatures and, to some extent, common law
courts. Because legislatures have been notoriously insensitive to
such interests as free speech and free press, the constitutional pro-
cess must intervene in order to protect these values. Although the
legislative process is capable of adequately dealing with such
things as food, drugs, and government revenue, free expression his-
torically has been too intangible and amorphous to rely on legisla-
tive protection. 9
Professor Schauer detects the special relevance of this notion to
the distinction in constitutional libel law between public officials
and public figures. He argues that, as public officials, legislators are
self-interested, and thus will be less inclined to enact provisions
protecting the press from libel actions brought by the group of
which they are members.7 0 With respect to public officials, there-
66. Generally, the only countervailing policy consideration to the recovery of damages for
mental disturbance in cases of negligence is the risk of vexatious suits and fraudulent
claims. This is basically the reason for the rule limiting recovery for mental distress to cases
of physical injury or impact. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328
(4th ed. 1971).
67. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S 629 (1968) (protecting children from obscene
materials); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
68. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 605.
69. In fact, the courts have consistently been required to scrutinize legislative enactments
in order to protect first amendment interests. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
70. See Schauer, supra note 13, at 926.
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fore, the majoritarian process cannot be trusted to properly bal-
ance the competing interests.
At least two facts regarding libel law make this suggestion mis-
leading. First, legislatures rarely have been active in the defama-
tion area.71 Thus, little reason exists to suspect that they would
ever act to protect the press from any kind of libel plain-
tiff-public or private. Second, in the one noteworthy exception to
legislative inaction in the libel area-the retraction statute-no
distinctions have been drawn between public officials and public
figures or private persons. These provisions typically limit a libel
plaintiff's recovery to special damages if he has failed to request a
retraction or if a satisfactory retraction has been printed upon re-
quest.7 12 Retraction statutes are designed to protect the publication
process and are noncategorical in their application.
Perhaps Professor Schauer's real point is that legislative bodies
are unlikely to be active in the libel area precisely because they
could not legitimately resolve the conflict between free press and
libel awards without including public officials within any restric-
tions imposed on the recovery of libel judgments. Legislatures
surely would not attempt to restrict libel actions brought by plain-
tiffs other than public officials while leaving themselves alone to
roam free in the libel arena. Such blatant preferential treatment is
especially irrational and unlikely given the obvious first amend-
ment interest in the discussion of those who hold public office.
If this is the nature of the back side notion, it is not a justifica-
tion for constitutionally distinguishing public figures from public
officials; 73 it is an argument for relegating the balance to some
other authority-obviously the courts. 'But judges, also as public
officials, would be equally disinclined, under either a constitutional
71. In fact, legislative bodies historically have been inactive in the tort field until rela-
tively recently. The only exception with respect to defamation is the retraction statute in
existence in a number of states. See W. PROSSER, supra note 66, § 116, at 800-01.
72. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE, § 48a (West 1982). Section 48a is the retraction statute that
was involved in Carol Burnett's suit against the National Enquirer. Burnett v. National
Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 997-1004, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208-13 (1983), appeal dis-
missed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
73. One could argue that, if the libel rights of legislators as public officials have already
been restricted by constitutional decision, the legislators might be more inclined to act to
protect the press from other kinds of plaintiffs. Such an argument appears tenuous, how-
ever, in light of the general legislative apathy with respect to first amendment interests.
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or common law rationale, to protect the media from libel actions
brought by this group. Carrying the argument this far suggests the
need for a definitive constitutional ruling from an altruistic Su-
preme Court insulating members of the media from libel suits
brought by public officials, and allowing the common law courts to
work out the remainder of the balance.
This conclusion is syllogistic, however, because it ignores two
considerations-one jurisprudential, the other historical. First,
even assuming the validity of the back side argument, it is only one
criteria among a host of others in the free press and libel equation.
In deciding the questions of whether, when, and to what extent we
should protect the press from libel suits, the functioning of the
majoritarian process is only one among a number of variables,
some of which have been mentioned previously,74 that must be
weighed in reaching an appropriate resolution. Theorizing about
the inability of legislatures and common law courts to weigh objec-
tively and sensitively the relevant variables in the case of defama-
tion of public officials should not somehow bootstrap this one fac-
tor into special significance.
Second, the back side argument ignores the historical reaction of
the common law courts. Like the limited legislative action in this
area, 7 5 court decisions have not distinguished between plaintiffs in
libel rulings. Broadly speaking, neither absolute nor qualified com-
mon law privileges have any direct reference to the status of the
plaintiff.76 More specifically, the two common law privileges most
closely associated with the news reporting process-fair comment
and reports of public proceedings 77 -are most likely to apply in a
case in which the plaintiff is a public official. In fact, Coleman v.
MacLennan,7 8 the case that foreshadowed the constitutional privi-
lege by extending the common law privilege of fair comment be-
yond statements of opinion to misstatements of fact, was brought
74. See supra text accompanying notes 39-68.
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
76. Generally, the absolute common law privileges apply to proceedings, occasions, or re-
lationships, and the qualified privileges attach when the publication is made in the dis-
charge of some public or private duty or in the defendant's own legitimate interest. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 66, §§ 114-115.
77. See id. §§ 115, 118, at 792, 822-23, 830-33.
78. 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
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by the Attorney General of Kansas.
The foregoing analysis of the impact of the back side notion sug-
gests that it has little relevance to libel law. Although a breakdown
in the majoritarian process in other areas may justify constitu-
tional intervention, 9 the possible malfunction in the defamation
area is too theoretical and hardly justifies a constitutional distinc-
tion between public officials and other libel plaintiffs.
IV. OF PUBLIC INTEREST
The less than compelling nature of the back side argument re-
vives the front side of the first amendment, and from this perspec-
tive, categorizing plaintiffs has at least some superficial appeal in
terms of first amendment theory. If the constitutional law of libel
were to draw further distinctions between political and nonpoliti-
cal public figures, however, the result would be an untidy constitu-
tional morass. Although lawyers and scholars covet finely drawn
jurisprudential categories, distinguishing public officials, political
public figures, nonpolitical public figures, and private individu-
als-and conditioning rules of recovery and first amendment pro-
tection on the group to which a libel plaintiff belongs-does not
strike me as the kind of breathing space a healthy notion of free
expression can tolerate.
The problem is that the current constitutional focus is askew.
Even under a narrow view of the first amendment, limiting fully
protected discussion to matters concerning public policy or govern-
mental operations, the focus should be on the subject matter dis-
cussed instead of the character or notoriety of the persons in-
volved. In at least this sense, the decision in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc.80 was the more sensitive and sensible approach,
and would have avoided the quagmire that Gertz and its progeny
have created.
Regardless of one's taste for the breadth of the actual holding in
Rosenbloom,81 its subject matter perspective retains constitutional
79. Race relations is an obvious example.
80. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
81. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Rosenbloom extended the New York Times
malice standard to any statement concerning a matter of public interest. 403 U.S. at 41-43.
Although Brennan's opinion spoke only for a plurality of three, the reasoning of Justices
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consistency and integrity. Even with the scope of the subject mat-
ter inquiry restricted to matters that directly affect self-govern-
ment, it is essentially a one-issue approach independent of fastidi-
ous categorization based on the status of the potential libel
plaintiff. If an article or story involves public policy or the func-
tioning of government, it should be protected by the New York
Times actual malice standard. s2 Although resolution of this issue
will not always be clear, 3 this standard of analysis gives the media
Black and Douglas that the first amendment provides the media with absolute immunity
from liability for defamation also supports the holding. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130, 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
82. The states might still be free under a Gertz analysis to apply a negligence standard in
other cases. See 418 U.S. at 247-50.
83. The resolution certainly will be no more troubling, however, than the public figure
issue that has plagued the courts since Gertz. See, e.g., Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 637
F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265,
1280 (3d Cir. 1979); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976); Carey v. Hume,
492 F.2d 631, 634 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Time, Inc. v. John-
ston, 448 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1971); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378 (5th Cir.
1971); Harris v. Tomczak, 94 F.R.D. 687 (E.D. Cal. 1982); McManus v. Doubleday & Co.,
513 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Vitale v. National Lampoon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), afi'd, 580 F.2d
859 (5th Cir. 1978); Bergman v. Stein, 404 F. Supp. 287, 297 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Hotchner
v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1046-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Buchanan v. Associated
Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1975); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp.
1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aft'd, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1976); Buckley v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Fram
v. Yellow Cab Co., 380 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Sewell v. Brookbank, 119 Ariz. 422,
581 P.2d 267 (1978); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, 45 Cal. App. 3d 938, 946, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 186, 191, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); Byers v. Southeastern Newspapers Corp.,
161 Ga. App. 717, 288 S.E.2d 698 (1982); Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253
N.E.2d 408 (1969); Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Cos., 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d
126 (1978); Korbar v. Hite, 43 Ill. App. 3d 636, 357 N.E.2d 135 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
837 (1977); Johnson v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508, 31 Ill. App. 3d 270, 276, 334
N.E.2d 442, 447 (1975); Basarich v. Rodeghero, 24 11M. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 321 N.E.2d 739,
742 (1974); State v. Defley, 395 So. 2d 759 (La. 1981); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514,
524, 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); James v. Gannett Co., 47
A.D.2d 437, 439, 366 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738-39 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 415,
353 N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976); Cera v. Mulligan, 79 Misc. 2d 400, 358 N.Y.S.2d
642 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Jones v. Gates-Chili News, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 837, 840, 358 N.Y.S.2d 649,
652 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P. 2d 1101 (Okla. 1978);
Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, 530
S.W.2d 611, 615-16 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Exner v. American Medical Ass'n, 12 Wash. App.
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the greatest protection in precisely those cases that lie at the philo-
sophical heart of freedom of the press. A publisher would be free
to release a story about matters of public concern without fear of
vindictive or vexatious retaliation by a plaintiff whose status is un-
certain. At the same time, a public figure might be able to recover
under a more lenient standard than New York Times when false
accusations are made about his or her private life.
The cases of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,4 Hutchinson v.
Proxmire,85 and Woiston v. Reader's Digest Association,88 for ex-
ample, all involved plaintiffs who were found to be private individ-
uals.87 The defendants in these cases, therefore, lost the protection
of the New York Times standard. Under a subject matter ap-
proach, however, all would have received the protection of the ac-
tual malice rule-Gertz involved the discussion of communism,88
Hutchinson involved federal spending,89 and Wolston involved So-
viet espionage.90 Even under a narrow first amendment view, each
deserved strict constitutional protection.
On the other hand, some material now protected by the New
.York Times standard would lose its favored status under a subject
matter rule. Although Carol Burnett is a public figure, her traips-
ing around a Washington restaurant, sharing her dessert, and spill-
ing wine is not a public issue under even the broadest of defini-
tions.9 1 Although any information about public officials arguably
could satisfy the subject matter rule,9 2 the Burnett example dem-
215, 529 P.2d 863 (1974).
84. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
85. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
86. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
87. Although the plaintiffs in these cases were not typical private individuals, the Su-
preme Court held them to be private individuals under its narrow definition of "public
figure." Elmer Gertz, for example, had written extensively, represented famous clients, and
made television and radio appearances, had been the subject of over forty articles in Chi-
cago newspapers, and had served as an officer of local civic groups and various professional
organizations. See Ashdown, supra note 38, at 680.
88. 418 U.S. at 325-26.
89. 443 U.S. at 114-17.
90. Id. at 159-63.
91. See Burnett v. National Enquirer, 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, . 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208
(1983), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984). The only conceivable public connection
was an alleged argument with Henry Kissinger. The National Enquirer's story about Ms.
Burnett probably would not satisfy even the Rosenbloom public interest standard.
92. Even information about the private lives of public officials may be relevant to their
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onstrates that much published information about public figures, as
well as private persons, would not qualify for strict free press
protection.
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional trouble with a true subject matter approach
is that the Supreme Court's current classification scheme does not
permit subject matter consideration with respect to public figures.
All material about public officials is arguably of public concern,
and the Supreme Court in Gertz has allowed the states to deter-
mine whether to apply a subject matter test to private individu-
als." With respect to public figures, however, the New York Times
malice standard applies regardless of whether the matter discussed
has public policy implications.
As I have argued earlier in this Article,"4 this is not problematic.
The status of a public figure attracts public attention, often culti-
vated and more than occasionally used for political ends. Addition-
ally, the public personality attracts continuing interest, which usu-
ally offsets any harm done by a defamatory publication. Thus, the
absence of a subject matter test for public figures is not constitu-
tionally critical.
The real need for a subject matter formula resides in the area
where the actual malice test is not now constitutionally man-
dated-publications about nonpublic persons. Some courts have
applied the Rosenbloom subject matter test here,95 but many have
accepted the Gertz invitation to adopt a negligence standard for
plaintiffs who are considered private individuals.96 The reaction of
fitness for public office and their ability to make public decisions.
93. 418 U.S. at 347-48.
94. See supra notes 39-68 and accompanying text.
95. See Rollenhagen v. City of Orange, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981);
Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982); Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975);
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, 162 Ind. App. 671, 321
N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82
Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38
N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke,
216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976).
96. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Dodrill v.
Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444
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the latter group of courts may be due, in part, to an insensitivity to
first amendment theory and a concomitant failure to make a criti-
cal distinction within the subject matter formula. A subject matter
standard obviously needs to be given content. In considering the
Gertz option to adopt a more lenient standard of liability in the
case of private plaintiffs, however, many courts may have consid-
ered only the broad public interest notion of Rosenbloom and re-
jected it without careful first amendment analysis. A subject mat-
ter approach limited to core first amendment interests-that is,
material concerning public policy, politics, and governmental oper-
ations-would be entirely consistent with a politically-oriented
theory of free press.
Although the Rosenbloom public interest analysis provides
greater breathing space for free expression,"7 courts should at least
recognize the constitutional need for New York Times protection
for the discussion of public policy matters. Evidently, this confu-
sion over the necessary scope of a subject matter approach has led
some courts to adopt a negligence standard for defamatory publi-
cations about private individuals without solicitude for first
U.S. 1076 (1980); Phillips v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S 989 (1981); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356
(1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); McCall v. Courier-
Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981); Wilson v. Capital City Press,
315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied specifically approving decision, 320 So. 2d 203
(La. 1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont.
54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App.
2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Televi-
sion, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12, 292 S.E.2d 23,
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412
(Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981); Taskett v. King Broad-
casting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (en banc); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d
636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982).
97. Even if one does not subscribe to the Rosenbloom theory of the first amendment that
the guarantees of speech and press extend not only to comments about public officials, pub-
lic affairs, and public personalities, but to all relevant information necessary to enable a
person to cope with a complex society, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 41-43
(1971), the public interest standard nevertheless provides insulation for the unfettered dis-
cussion of public policy and governmental operations, which are at the core of free
expression.
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amendment values.98
After Gertz, the states have been at liberty to abandon the ac-
tual malice rule for private plaintiffs. Judges should hesitate, how-
ever, before applying a negligence standard to all publications in-
volving private individuals. Much of this material is at the core of
self-government,"9 and deserves New York Times protection to en-
sure robust, wide-open discussion. Even if one eschews the broader
concept of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,100 the New York
Times test should nevertheless protect material dealing with socio-
political and public policy matters. At least in this narrower sense
of public interest, a subject matter standard is needed.
98. See supra note 96.
99. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (Soviet espionage);
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (federal spending); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (communist conspiracy); Browning v. Birmingham News, 348 So.
2d 455 (Ala. 1977) (city contracting of services); Rollenhagen v. City of Orange, 116 Cal.
App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981) (investigation by State Consumer Affairs Depart-
ment); Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982) (report
of investigations of state and federal agencies); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56
Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975) (discussion of sociopolitical affiliations and political influ-
ence); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981) (alleged
bribery of a judge); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693
(1978) (judicial ethics); DeCharvalho v. da Silva, 414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980) (U.S. immigra-
tion); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976) (elected county surveyor
held not to be a public official for purposes of litigation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977);
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) (report to humane society).
100. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
